Around the globe, we are witnessing multitudinous struggles over rights. Several of these are collective struggles by marginal and dispossessed groups over what Walter Mignolo has termed "life rights" with some resisting precarity and dispossession heralded in by neoliberal developmentalism and its championing of privatization of natural resources: mountains, minerals, forests, rivers and streams; while others are struggling to redefine the substantive content of existing formal constitutional guarantees. 1 The key question this essay asks is: How do we conceptually capture these rights struggles? In South Asia, and particularly in India, many of these rights struggles have not been without policy and legislative successes, and several pioneering and innovative legislative acts are now in place guaranteeing citizen entitlements to information, food, and employment and land rights, and there now exists a growing and sophisticated scholarship analyzing the functioning, shortfalls, as well as the impact of these newly introduced acts and policy measures. 2 Within this burgeoning scholarship and more generally, however, less attention is paid to the conceptual and epistemic languages of rights underpinning these struggles by marginal groups or of the nature of subjectivities and subjection these mobilizations engender, or indeed to the forms of rights politics these generate. To put it more specifically, we are yet to know of the justificatory premises of rights that inform and activate demands for expanded entitlements; or of the nature of rights languages underpinning "self-making" exercises mobilized in becoming a subject of formal rights; or of the traversal of rights and human rights; or indeed of the ways by which statecraft, governmentalities, and the market intersect and facilitate the dissemination of particular rights subjectivities. In short, we know altogether very little of how rights languages are constituted and articulated by marginal subjects. In this essay, I argue not only that these questions spearhead the study of the emergence and operation of rights cultures in marginal contexts in "most of the world" but also that their study requires a different conceptual lens-one that is able to capture their dynamism but also their difference. I will call this lens vernacular rights cultures. 3 Viewing rights politics through the framework of vernacular rights cultures offers a means by which the complexity and dynamism of rights-based mobilizations might be analytically captured, not simply as ones engaged in the translation and enacting of "global human rights" but as those that have their own languages of rights and entitlements grounded in specific political imaginaries, justificatory premises, and subjectivities. In short, vernacular rights cultures generate both a distinct set of rights and distinct practices through which rights are delivered, but also transform the rights that are inscribed in constitutions and political imaginaries.
This essay has three goals: to briefly introduce the framework of vernacular rights cultures; to document the literal and conceptual languages of rights that animate contemporary citizen mobilizations in Southern Asia; and to draw attention to the political imaginaries, subjectivities, and claims for subject status that underpin the latter. The predominant word signifying a right in South Asia is the Urdu/Arabic Urdu literal term haq, and in this essay I focus on the justificatory premises that underpin the deployment of haq within grassroots citizen struggles in the region. Here, I will bring notes from the field into conversation with four existing literatures: the ethnographic scholarship on haq and the philosophical work on the nature and structure of rights on the one hand, and on the other, the anthropology and the political theory of a "global" phenomenon called human rights. The vernacular rights cultures I will describe are essentially those of subaltern groups, groups who are not, in Spivakian terms, "outside all lines of social mobility" but who are in fact actively involved in the struggle for expanding the terms of their representation through taking up rights discourses. I draw on my rights ethnographies of grassroots groups in Rajasthan mobilizing under the umbrella network of the "right to food" movement in India and of Punjabi peasants demanding land rights in Pakistan in order to offer an analysis of the rights language that underpins vernacular rights cultures.
A Short Note on Vernacular Rights Cultures and on Haq
In capsule form, the study of vernacular rights cultures is the study of the forms that rights politics takes in the "most of the world" and of the ways it disrupts hegemonic human rights talk. It insists on the specificity of rights talk and on a multiperspectival and critical politics of location. It attends not only to the distinct spatio-temporal histories and languages of claim making but also to the transformations, enablements, and limits to claim making in the neoliberal present. It tracks the distinct trajectories, formulations, and intersections of languages of rights and human rights in marginal contexts and in so doing disrupts overarching narratives of epistemic progress, linearity, historical continuity, or their radical separateness that underpin contemporary discussions of human rights. As a conceptual intervention, the lens of vernacular rights cultures sidesteps the theoretical foreclosures and binary deadlock of mainstream discussions on human rights to argue that vernacular rights cultures are not wholly derivative from or entirely oppositional to Western notions and conventions of human rights or, indeed, entirely discrete in form, in that one would be hard pressed to find hermetically sealed or "pure" indigenous rights traditions. They are instead interlocked into relations that are historically, productively, intimately, and coercively produced and experienced. In exploring the different sites where formulation, translation, and transposition of rights take place, vernacular rights cultures is a key intervention for not only tracking the etymological histories of the literal language of rights outside of the Western world but also focusing on the particular forms of conceptual development in rights/human rights resulting from the colonial encounter and anticolonial nationalism, the setting up of the postcolonial state and its distinct forms of developmentalism and bureaucratization, and, more recently, "imagining the real," Geertz writes that haq, which he identifies as a key Arabic jurisprudential term, not only captures a "distinctive way of imagining the real"; its capacious meaning bridges the fact-law divide characteristic of Western legal practices, invoking a "deeper connection" between the "normative and the ontological" or the "right and the real." 8 He gives examples from everyday Moroccan usage to illustrate the moral, normative, ontological, juridical, and religious connotations of haq, and he identifies different ways in which haq is applied and where each "level of application"-religious, metaphysical, normative/moral, and a jural/enforceable claim-reveals a consistent "identity between the right and the real" or that between the empirical and the normative. 9 Lawrence Rosen also notes the normative and the ontological connections of haq in his ethnographic investigations of qadi justice in a qadi court in the Moroccan city of Sefrou, where he observes the role and application of haq in legal adjudications.
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Through his ethnography, Rosen examines the influence of "cultural assumptions" in shaping "judges' modes of reasoning, factual assessments, and choice of remedies" to argue that law (including in North America) is not only "suffused by culture and cultural is integral to law" but is also a critical site for negotiating questions of equity and discretion. 11 In the qadi courts at Sefrou, questions of equity and discretion invariably involve adjudicating over the operation and validation of haq. Rosen writes that Moroccan society is constructed around "a series of interpersonal ties, freely negotiated and highly expedient which center on each individual every relationship implies an obligation . . . it is however, clearly understood that every action one takes creates an obligation in the other, and the key to the formation of network of personal ties . . . this sense of mutual ingratiation and indebtedness is broadly subsumed by Moroccans under the central Arabic concept of haqq."
12 To speak of haq is to convey that sense of mutual obligations that bind men to men, and man to God. Each of these obligations is open to negotiation, and the question of whose obligation or haq is valid, "true," or "real" needs to be settled. 13 And it is in the qadi courts that the legal validation of haq is established.
Cutting across southwest from Morocco and to another Islamic legal context on the African continent, Susan F. Hirsch examines the discursive and dynamic constructions of gendered subjectivities and positionings in legal interactive speech over marital disputations in Kadhi courts in coastal Kenya. Unlike Rosen, Hirsch focuses less on Kadhi negotiations of equity and discretion than on the discourses available for "marital disputing." A predominant literal and conceptual language of marital disputing in Hirsch's ethnography is that of haki, the Swahili version of haq deployed by the disputants in Hirsch's ethnography. According to Hirsch, "when disputants use haki, they produce distinct senses of the term that presuppose identifiably different discourses-one of specific, actionable laws and one of ethics or just behavior." Although "in the abstract, haki can embody haq in all three senses" identified by Geertz-of real, reality and God, with ethics and just behavior and with law and justice-"in Swahili marital disputes, most deployments of haki tend either towards rights or justice." 14 These ethnographic deployments of haq in the different Islamic contexts explore Islamic jurisprudential traditions where haq operates as an "orienting" concept of Islamic law and theology. 15 My ethnographic tracking of haq in the subcontinent, on the other hand, reveals that the use of haq is not limited to Muslim communities in the region nor indeed to only contexts of the application and adjudication of Muslim Personal Law, which incidentally governs Muslim communities in both India and Pakistan. 16 In fact, a striking aspect of its deployment in the region is its use across geographical, linguistic, and religious groups. For instance, in Rajasthan, where I have been conducting fieldwork since 1999, recent census figures suggest that Muslims constitute just 9.07 percent of the state's population, and Urdu (usually associated with Muslim communities in the subcontinent) is only ever spoken by 1.17 percent of the people. 17 In short, my point is that the use of haq in the region is not confined to Islamic jurisprudentialism but has a wider presence that includes claim making and seeking expanded citizenship entitlements from the state and its secular legal framework not always in alignment with Islamic juristical settlements of haq.
In what follows, I will identify three justificatory premises of haq and its "applications" within contemporary struggles for rights in India and Pakistan that produce vernacular rights cultures by filtering, mediating, and interpreting rights through particular political imaginaries. By political imaginaries of haq, I refer to a set of dynamic gendered relations, ideas, practices, discourses, institutions, and subjectivities that attach to haq, and in turn those which it mediates, justifies, accords meaning to, and upholds. By the plural imaginaries, I am referring not to a single but rather a multiplicity of mediations of haq, each produced within particular political contexts of struggle, and in line with the insights of Geertz, Rosen, and Hirsch, stipulating a "sense of how things usually go . . . interwoven with . . . how they ought to go." 18 Thus, haq orients proper ordering of relations among persons, contains within itself an image of a gendered moral order, and mediates citizenship, political discourse, and political struggles.
In India, my fieldwork has over the years spread to six districts of Rajasthan and has consisted mainly of recording narratives of development workers, grassroots political workers, and participants of various citizen movements organizing under the umbrella of the right to food movement. 19 In Pakistan, I have documented the deployment of haq by the Anjuman Mazarain demanding land rights in the Punjab. There are at least five significant things to note about the contemporary applications of rights language or haq that I will document. First, the deployment of a right is not through a neologism but within the vernacular and as "haq," and rights articulations do not occur as singular or even odd prototypes but draw on and are negotiated through existing moral vocabularies and political grammar of norms, law, rules, entitlements, rights, and identities. Second, vernacular rights cultures signal the overlapping and intersecting nature of the languages of rights and those of human rights, rather than insisting on either historical continuity or separation. In so doing, they resist theoretical foreclosure by sidestepping the paradox between the rights of man and of the citizen that characterizes much of the human rights debates in the Anglo-European world; if anything, vernacular rights cultures show that rights of man and of citizen are codependent, struggled for, and intricately interwoven rather than paradoxical. Third, these rights cultures are coproduced through and invoked within multiple and diverse encounters with developmentalism, statism, legal constitutionalism, and activism; therefore, it is at the intersection of these, and not as some freestanding abstraction, that haq as a contemporary idea operates. In fact, as the ethnographic descriptions demonstrate, these intersections are integral to the formation of vernacular rights cultures. Fourth, despite the extensive deployment of haq within citizen mobilizations, individual rights regulate neither interpersonal relations nor social life in either India or Pakistan. And fifth, the demand for gender equality or haq for women is a question that almost invariably needs to be addressed separately and seldom occurs organically within citizen mobilizations, a limitation, perhaps, of the factual-normative structure of haq, which does not quite allow its easy translation into all demands for equality and rights. However, it is the case that demands of haq for women are voiced and that their enunciation brings into sharp relief not only the indivisibility and the intersectional nature of rights, including imbrication of individual with collective rights, but also their inherently conflictual nature. For instance, demanding the "right to information" from elected representatives or public officials about public programs of health, education, or employment in many cases involved a simultaneous claim for gender and caste equality and also drew attention to corruption in the local state bureaucracy and judiciary and to the flouting of procedural norms by the administrative, executive, and legislative components. Perhaps it is the indivisible nature of rights-of political and civic entitlements intersecting and interwoven with individual rights-that makes rights politics so conflictual.
Haq as a Positive Legal Right of Citizenship
In India and Pakistan, several strands of rights discourses circulate, of which three prominent ones are legal constitutionalism, developmentalism, and religious/ethnic nationalism, the latter expressed more in the language of freedom and autonomy from the nation-state than of citizen rights per se. Although divergent in their experience of democracy, representative government, and citizenship, both countries guarantee fundamental rights to citizens, albeit with qualifications and with varying degrees of success and coverage. 20 Both have superior judiciaries which have been less reticent in referencing and upholding international human rights law. 21 While judicial activism is a recent phenomenon in Pakistan, the Indian Supreme Court in the postemergency era has developed a reputation as a "torchbearer of human rights" even if "its impact on the ground is not consistent." 22 Moreover, both India and Pakistan have a visible and vibrant women's movement and an active institutional discourse on gender equality. Finally, discourses of development and human rights have a discernible presence on both sides of the border, particularly in the NGO sector. 23 In short, therefore, the three justificatory premises of rights/haq that I document here and that span India and Pakistan do not occur in some conceptual bubble; they are articulated and negotiated in contexts of sustained encounters and interactions with developmentalism, colonial/postcolonial law, militarism, statism, and constitutionalism. By developmentalism, a term I prefer to "development," I refer to not only a set of institutions, discourses, and practices but also a "condition" or a "way of being." This developmentalism is normative in its aims and includes both state and nonstate actors; it speaks the language of self-empowerment and individual rights and has the transformation of subjectivities as its explicit aim; it also mediates the experience and knowledge of constitutional settlement on citizenship. 24 In India, social movements are a variegated lot comprising "identity" and "interest" groups which more often than not practice a "dual level political activism" of engaging the government in order to influence public policy, while also challenging societal norms and practices. 25 Although some social movements see the state as the main oppressor, others participate in a much more "situationally developed politics" directing their campaigns at the judiciary for legal and policy reforms and for redressing injustices meted out by the state. 26 An example of the latter is the right to food network in India, itself imbricated within nonstate developmentalism and formed in 2001 as an umbrella group by several NGOs predominantly based in Rajasthan in order to frame a people's response in the wake of the state government's apathy and inaction in the wake of successive droughts, a time which ironically also coincided with a surfeit of official stocks of food grain. The growing hunger and destitution across rural areas of the state prompted the Rajasthan branch of the People's Union for Civil liberties to submit "a writ petition accepted as a Public Interest Litigation or PIL" (a form of judge-led or "juridical democracy" that became operational in India in the postemergency period for "activating" fundamental rights and providing protection from "excesses of state power" to the Indian Supreme Court in April 2001) questioning whether the "right of life guaranteed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution also included the right to food." 27 In its response, the Supreme Court passed interim orders for the countrywide implementation of the "mid-day meals" scheme under which a cooked meal would be provided to all children attending government-aided schools. In addition to pursuing legal strategies, the right to food network also organized community action through setting up village level akal sangharsh samiti (ASS) or "drought action committees" to scrutinize aspects of drought relief assistance and governance procedures and to mobilize popular support in favor of a federal law guaranteeing the right to food. In March 2013, the Indian cabinet approved the Food Security Act, a scheme looking to provide subsidized nutrition to two-thirds of the Indian population at an annual cost of 1.3 trillian rupees. Although the legislation suffers from several shortfalls, in light of increased destatization and prevailing neoliberal-inspired economic orthodoxies prescribing one-size-fits-all models of self-sufficiency, autonomy, and entrepreneurial citizenship, it is indeed remarkable that this citizen activism has resulted in expanding the rights dispensation of the postcolonial state to secure for its most vulnerable citizens what is by all accounts an "old fashioned" social-welfarist legislation.
In the narratives of the grassroots participants of the right to food movement, by far the most ubiquitous justificatory premise underpinning rights claims or haq was that rights accrued to one through citizenship. Perhaps this is not entirely unsurprising given the institutional focus of the movement. 28 In effect, one can detect two different but related ideas of citizenship in the narratives of haq: the first is a discernibly "active" view of citizenship that regards rights as crucial for political participation and for exercising citizenship, while the second is a more or less straightforward legalist notion of citizenship that predicates rights upon legal constitutionalism. An unmistakably "active" view of citizenship replete with notions of self-governance, accountability, and responsibility is clearly enunciated by the political and field workers of the MKSS. The MKSS or the "Association for Workers and Farmers," also a part of the right to food network, has been involved in a long struggle for the right of ordinary citizens to gain access to state financial records and to state audits of development projects. It spearheaded a social movement espousing the right of public information and of the people's right to know about the government's economic functioning, which led to the passage of a federal Right to Information Act in June 2005. The right to information (RTI) movement began in the early 1990s to highlight the gross failures of the state to uphold minimum-wage legislation particularly within drought relief programs set up to provide stipulated employment to people in drought affected districts and to focus on the flagrant inefficiencies and corrupt practices within the state public distribution system (PDS). The people's right to public information was seen as a key political tool with which to scrutinize reasons for endemic rural poverty and as a means of enforcing democratic accountability and transparency. However, the activities of the MKSS have not been limited to exposing the everyday forms of official corruption and focusing on procedures of governmental accountability but have also come to expose the "multifaceted nature of corruption" within the legal and political system championing innovative social techniques of mobilization and public appraisal. 29 The passage below is excerpted from a lengthy conversation with two prominent members of the MKSS:
As citizens, we have haq over this road, the road is built with our money. It is "our" money because we pay income tax and we pay also tax on whatever we buy such as rice, dal, and cooking oil. That is how the sarkar [the state/government] builds hospitals and schools. It builds these with "our" money. The money that people think is sarkari or the building that is deemed to be sarkari, we say to them: it is not sarkari, it is "our" building and it is "our" money. "Our" democracy must be safeguarded for that will make our rights safe. "Our" effort should be that the constitution continues to guarantee the rights of citizens.
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In a different vein and what might appear at least initially a predominantly statist/ legalist notion of citizenship, consider the following excerpt from an interview with Prem Bairwa, a dalit woman member of the village council in her village of Kotkhawada, Jaipur district. 31 In addition to her role as a member of the local village council, Prem Bairwa is affiliated with a large and well-funded NGO that explicitly describes itself as a "facilitator in the development process" and is also closely associated with the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a nationallevel advocacy organization in India.
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As a council member, I have a haq in the panchayat [village council] to get development done in the village. Do only men have the right to speak and conduct political business; are not women to enjoy these rights equally? It is a fight for my haq and a fight I have to fight myself. The government has given these rights to women; Indira Gandhi started the mahila raj of women. Before her, there were no women's rights. In case the government changes "our" rights then we have to fight the government. After all, it is "us" who make the government. 33 At the outset, these two views of citizenship appear to resonate with liberal citizenship (subjects with rights) and also with those of civic republicanism and its ideas of selfgovernance, rights, and public service. They also seem to uphold the "umbilical relationship" between rights and the state. 34 Yet these would be quick conclusions for at least two reasons: first, liberal citizenship is based on a contractual arrangement between individuals and the state on the basis of negative liberty, and civic republicanism with its valorization of political participation takes homogenous political communities as self-evident. Neither liberal selfhood nor the assumption of single axial political identities informs the justificatory premise of haq as citizenship. This is not least because the rights subjectivities engaged by haq are not always individuated, and also because citizenship's common unitary identity fractures only too easily by the actual practice of rights and citizenship especially by marginal subjects. Second, while it would seem that these deployments of haq conflate legal rights with entitlements, a widespread academic tendency that cuts across disciplinary divides, where rights and entitlements are mainly (and interchangeably) understood as positive legal rights attached to corresponding obligations, liabilities, addressees, and duties. However, paying close attention to the narratives above shows that claims of haq exceed this predominant and legalist understanding of rights and entitlements. 35 If anything, the deployments of haq in my ethnographies embrace legal rights but also draw attention to entitlements or to extra-jural claims.
Within analytical philosophy, the distinction between rights and entitlements is not only one between legal and moral rights; it also concerns the more general question of the structure of rights, the relationship between rights and obligations, and the justifications of rights itself. Consequently, the relationship among rights, claims, and entitlements has engaged philosophical discussions, and many philosophers make some careful and intricate distinctions among them. 36 Some view rights not as claims or powers but rather as essentially "entitlements to do, have, enjoy or have done" and, consequently, independent of a corresponding duty holder in place from who rights can be claimed against. 37 Others, however, envisage rights as "valid claims" backed by mandatory positive legal sanctions with a corresponding duty holder and/or addressee in place, where there might (as in the case of moral rights) be a claim for recognition based on existing moral principles. Joel Feinberg, who is most closely associated with this view, regards rights as "valid claims" which are always "correlated with another's duty," but he also makes allowances for a "manifesto" sense of rights in some contexts, which are entitlements without corresponding duty holders in place. 38 As is evident, the chief distinction between valid and manifesto claims is over where to place the burden of obligation. But the relationship between rights and obligations or duties is more often than not overdetermined by the question of law: rights are judged "valid" or "weak" depending on their relation to law. In other words, where there is no strong link between the two, there is unlikely to be a right, at least in the strictest sense. 39 The activist narratives in my ethnographies deploy haq to denote "valid claims" in-so-far as they claim haq over clearly identified sets of legal obligations and a stipulated addressee ( the state), but often, demanding haq is also to claim recognition for an altogether new or a different set of rights or for an expanded set of rights. So, for instance, the political demands of the right to food movement and of the MKSS for the right to public information were raised in the first instance as qualified versions of "manifesto" demands which were subsequently successfully converted into "valid claims" with the passage of federal laws on the same; these were qualified manifesto rights in the first instance, because unlike Feinberg's definition of manifesto rights, these were directed toward a specified addressee (the state) and were therefore not unspecified claims. While it follows here that deployments of haq certainly coincide with legal rights, albeit with certain qualifications, what does this legal coincidence lead us to infer about the nature of the justification underpinning haq here? Does haq only ever hold in the presence of legal rights? Or to put it another way, does haq depend on declared legal rights to sustain its meaning and authority?
At first reading, the above narratives appear to uphold a correlative link between rights and legal constitutionalism, in the sense that haq or rights are premised on, depend on, and are justified by legal constitutional citizenship. However, if one were to examine how haq mediates citizenship in these narratives more carefully, one would find that haq does not quite posit a symmetric and correlative relation between itself and the positivist legal order of the state. In fact, on close inspection, one will note a peculiar conceptual insight: whether these narratives rest their justificatory premise of rights on law or the state or on the constitutional rights and obligations of citizens, they retain with the people the right to change both the law/government or the constitution, in the final instance, if these fail to uphold the rights of citizens. For instance, in advocating constant vigilance over the state on citizen rights, both Prem Bairwa and the MKSS activists align haq with legal constitutionalism but crucially also withhold its subsumption into the latter. Although the justificatory premise of rights in the two narratives draw on law/constitution and on legal citizenship, in both cases there is a clear enunciation that even though law/constitution is required, haq has an independent justificatory premise separate from the formal legal regime of rights and lies in what Brett has termed a "zone of non coincidence between individuals and the positive legal order of the state." 40 Haq, therefore, refers to and is based on an ethical, normative, moral, and empirical idea, which exists independent of the law and has a moral authority of its own.
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A Cosmological Justification for Haq
I now turn to a justificatory premise for haq predominantly embedded in ideas of the "ancestral," the "historical," the "prior," and the cosmological. Importantly, and as before, this justification too is not articulated in a discrete or an ahistorical way but emerges in particular political, institutional, and historical contexts of developmentalism, citizen activism, and legal constitutionalism.
In my ethnography, the ancestral or cosmological premise for rights is mainly articulated by the indigenous peoples' activists who are part of a large umbrella movement for rights to forest land claimed as ancient and sacred, which in Southern Rajasthan is known as the Jungle Zameen Jan Andolan (JZJA). 42 The organization Jungle Zameen Jan Andolan came into existence in 1995 and now covers seven southern districts of Rajasthan. It was formed as a response to the forcible evictions of Rajasthan's aboriginal communities or adivasis from their lands and traditional homes deep within the forests. India is not a signatory to the ILO Convention 169 on the rights of the indigenous peoples but it does provide special constitutional safeguards for indigenous peoples or the Scheduled Tribes. 43 The history of forest dispossessions, however, predates the postcolonial state and is more than a century old. It became systematized with the enactment by the colonial state of the Indian Forest Act in 1865 and its subsequent amendments in 1878 and 1927, which reserved a fifth of land area as "government forest" primarily for increasing revenue and for "marketable timber," resulting in the removal of forest communities from designated "government forests." 44 In postcolonial Rajasthan, the dispossession and eviction of aboriginal peoples from their land is a fallout from the passage of the Rajasthan Forest Act of 1953 that converted tribal forest rights into "concessions" and required aboriginal dwellers to show "proof" in the form of documentary evidence in support of their land or dwelling rights over the forest land. In the absence of correct procedural documentation, the land belonging to the adivasis was suddenly transferred to the state forest department, and the adivasis became known in official speak as "tribal tillers" and thereby "encroachers" on forestland. Over the years, the state government has sought to address the conditions of "tribal tillers" by ensuing notifications in 1978 and 1991 to regularize forest land possession, but these governmental circulars were not publicized among the beneficiary populations and even less implemented. In 2002, the arbitrary, violent, and coercive evictions of the aboriginal forest communities and other nontribal forest dwellers from their homes and lands were carried out at scale "unprecedented in recent history." 45 In October 2006, as a direct outcome of a nationwide displaced forest dwellers campaign, the federal parliament passed legislation decreeing a bill of rights of forest tribes or the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (recognition of Forest Rights) Act to address the "historical injustices" suffered by India's forest communities.
The Forest Act 2006 provides for individual rights and also collective community governance over forest land. In its implementation, however, the act has preferred to deal with individual claims over forest land and has paid "little attention to provisions to facilitate community control of state-owned forest areas." 46 In Southern Rajasthan, there are several locally based organizations affiliated with the JZJA that mobilize people on issues of collective governance over forest land and produce, as well as against state-led eviction and violence on development projects inside forest land. One of these local groups is based in Kotra Block in Udaipur district and is known as the Kotra Adivasi Vikas Manch (Kotra Aboriginal Development Group). They are specifically concerned with the fallout from the Phulwari Ki Naal wildlife sanctuary, which was declared a sanctuary in 1983 and encompasses 134 villages in the area. 47 In the interview I represent below, one of my interviewees, Harmi Bai, a former secretary of the Adivasi Vikas Manch Kotra, and member of the Bhil tribe, describes the aboriginal peoples' resistance to the declaration of the Phulwari Ki Naal sanctuary and of the difficulties that this has caused. The designation of Phulwari Ki Naal as a sanctuary has led to a series of restrictions on people's access to the forest and on their collection and consumption of forest produce such as honey, firewood, wood, fruits, medicinal herbs, tree bark, and leaves, which the aboriginal villagers depend on for their everyday survival. The ban also has a commercial sting: the villagers used to collect tendu leaves (local tobacco substitute) from the forest and then bundle and sell them off to the contractors who came from the cities for manufacture as beedis. The sale of tendu leaves is a seasonal activity and even a two-week collection could earn a medium-sized household enough money for the whole season. 48 The ban on forest produce has led to a substantial loss of earnings for aboriginal households with the result that a majority of these households are now forced to undertake "seasonal migration," mainly to work on the large landholdings in neighboring states as agricultural sharecroppers or laborers. In an excerpted conversation Harmi Bai reflects on some of these difficulties:
Earlier, we used to take the produce openly from the jungles and without any restriction and then suddenly, we were told that there was a prohibition on the forest produce as this was now a sanctuary for wild animals. We were told that we could not build homes or rear our animals or sow the field inside the jungle. We were told that this was now protected land and a sanctuary and that they were now going to develop a park inside it and that tourists were going to come from abroad to visit the sanctuary. . . .
We continue to take the produce from the forests. We only take what we need. We are the owners of this jungle and the lands therein; we have a haq over these. Wherever there are adivasis there are jungles, in the cities there are no jungles. We have protected the jungles. The haq over these forests and water comes from our ancestors. These are our sacred lands-our ancestral spirits reside here-we have ancestral rights over these lands. Our forefathers have used this land for centuries. We tell the state forest officials, you do your job and stay here and that together we can stop the jungle mafia who go into the jungles in their lorries illegally and for commercial purposes. But you cannot stop us from taking the produce for our own use from these jungles or force us off our land.
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Harmi Bai and her fellow activists of the Kotra Adivasi Vikas Manch spoke to me mostly in the Bhili/Bhilodi language, which made the presence of haq in their vocabulary, a word whose intellectual provenance and trajectory is vastly different from Bhili/Bhilodi, quite striking. In the narratives of the Bhil activists, haq has very specific applications. It is hardly ever used to claim gender rights and equality, and where it is, it draws on legal constitutionalism and not on prior entitlements. It is more often than not deployed to claim qudrati haq, or those rights justified by and/or in alignment with what nature or the cosmos intended. It is also used to signify nazar qabza or community recognition, a possessive claim to untitled land and property not recognized in legal/state documents but one that is upheld by a council of community chiefs known as Bhanjgarhiya.
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Thus the deployments of haq encompass individual and collective claims but also legal, moral, and cosmological ones. In demanding their haq to their forests, the Bhil aboriginal activists are staking a "valid or justified claim" over ancestral forests landsthese claims are recognized under the Forest Rights Act 2006, which also identifies the state as the obligation bearer-even though their justification of these rights claims is independent of the state and its constitutional legalism framed primarily around liberty and welfare. 51 In deploying haq to invoke ancestral entitlements that are nonderivative from the state but require the latter's legal protection and implementation, the Bhil activists open up a discursive space that seeks an expanded rights dispensation from the state. In seeking "nonderivative" rights from the state, the Bhil activists underline the point that rights are not creations of the state or of the government but that they are "dynamic" and have independent justifications. 52 Let me make two further remarks about the distinctions between the discursive deployments of haq in the above narrative and the category of a positive legal right in Anglo-American rights theorizing. Unlike the moral individualism espoused by several dominant rights theories, haq is not the moral property of self-regarding individuals and thereby does not only engage in establishing jural "correlatives" and opposites between "pairs of individuals," that is, what rights individuals have in relation to others and to which the latter are obligated. Propelling the analytical debate on rights is the existence of "dichotomies," not least between abstract freedom and the context of choice or the one between individual autonomy and the public good. 53 However, the deployment of haq does not suggest or uphold dichotomous relationships between individuals and the public good; rather, it signifies a cosmic inseparability and indivisibility of individuals from the collective good. And second, even if rights theorists do not premise rights on a commitment to individualism or if they refuse a rights-based morality, they continue to insist that rights provide grounds "for action in the interest of other beings." Thus rights are envisaged to serve interests only of individuals as human beings whether as individuals or in collectives; rights, whether individual or collective, have to be "consistent with humanism." 54 Therein lies the rub. Neither humanism nor moral sovereignty of individuals or their interests, whether collective or individual, provide the justification for the haq claimed by the Bhil activists over their ancestral forests and against their dispossession. In their narratives, haq operates to uphold a cosmological and a normative order with its prescribed set of ethical relations and responsibilities, which include duties to (protect) nature. 55 It has a normative, nonhumanist, cosmic-ontological quality, and its normative and ethical remit extends beyond self-regarding individuals and their acts of claim making to invoke a social and political imaginary of living in the world alongside other species beings. Now, although Harmi Bai and her group along with the JZJA have been unsuccessful in their bid to get the sanctuary notification quashed in the courts, they have been able to use the rights under the forest rights act, especially those empowering elected village councils to decide on the use of forest lands for "non-forestry" purposes and for "mega industrial projects," to stop the relocation of four villages to facilitate progress of the Phulwari Ki Naal sanctuary. 56 The act has clearly encouraged democratic energies and strengthened gram sabhas (village assemblies), which have organized popular resistance to large capital takeover in the name of development, including opposition to the work of the global mining giant Vedanta Aluminum. However, the act has also led to increased coercion and state violence against aboriginal communities engaged in such resistance. 57 In the face of increasing opposition on the ground and mounting pressure by international capital, on October 28, 2014, the Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a directive that "exempts" any land-use proposal for industrial purposes from the requirement of seeking the consent of the gram sabhas, thereby severely curtailing the democratic gains of the forest act. 58 
An Islamic Justification of Haq
Tracking haq further northwest and into Pakistan, the mobilizations of the Anjuman Mazarain (Peasants association of Punjab) in rural Punjab provide us with yet another insight into the specific political imaginaries that produce particular vernacular rights cultures. The Mazarain demanded the restoration of their ownership and sharecropping rights to the land taken over by the Pakistani military. The Mazarain's struggles must be seen in the context of the dominance of the military in Pakistan, which is also among the largest landowners in Pakistan. The military has achieved this position through organizing "land transfers" to itself and the wider "military fraternity." It has done this not by illegal or extra-institutional means but through legal and institutional manipulations with some aid from systematic acts of state violence. 59 Recent scholarship on Pakistan has documented the nature and extent of the military's "economic predatoriness" and traced its roots to the "unique colonial social contract" that produced loyal colonial subjects through operating land distribution/transfers: a mode of patronage that the military in Pakistan has carried over into the postcolonial state with great effectivity. 60 A striking commonality in the struggles of both the JZJA and the Anjuman Mazarain is that they must both contend with the continuing haunting of colonial legal arrangements and the social and economic arrangements these instituted. In the case of Pakistan, the carryover of colonial legal arrangements has helped forge a postcolonial "state-society consensus" based on the "guardianship of the military." 61 For not only do these "land transfers" to the Pakistani military owe their legal and institutional legitimacy to various colonial-era laws such as the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Colonization of Land Act 1912 (later updated by the government of Pakistan in 1965) but the management of these lands by the military in postcolonial Pakistan is based on Cantonment Land Administration Rules 1937 used by the colonial military. 62 Yet it is also the case that the "state-society consensus" in Pakistan suffered a significant "fracture" over the question of land, when peasant sharecroppers in Okara and Khanewal mounted a "resistance to the post-colonial state dominated by the army." 63 Essentially, the Anjuman Mazarain demand ownership over the land they have been tilling since 1885, when under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act the colonial state transferred populations to its newly built "canal colonies" and irrigation projects, promising to bequeath ownership rights to resettled populations over these lands. But this promise was never upheld, either in the colonial period or by the postcolonial state. As a result, these peasants continued cultivating only on the basis of usufruct rights over the land and as sharecroppers rather than landowning peasants. Except for a short period between 1957 and 1960, when ownership of some of this land was transferred to the Mazarain, an order that was subsequently rescinded, the peasant populations on these lands have more or less continued to till the land according to the sharecropping and tenancy rights established under the 1884 act. In the first months of the year 2000, the military administrators of these farms introduced changes to the original terms of the contract and revised the basis of the prevailing peasant sharecropping arrangement concluded over a century ago, which regulated the share of the agricultural produce and occupancy rights. The revised terms of the contract replaced sharecropping and its proportional division of crop yields with the requirement of cash rentals. 64 Fearing economic destitution and eviction, the peasant sharecropper farmers organized themselves as the Anjuman Mazarain adopting the slogan maalki ya maut (ownership or death) in order to oppose the new terms of the contract and, in so doing, openly challenged Pakistani military rule.
On October 7, 2000 , five thousand peasant farmers organized a peaceful protest against the new tenancy laws proposed by the military. Two days later, armed police along with the frontier constabulary entered the village and started a campaign of violence against the village sharecroppers. Thus began four years of intimidation and siege of the Okara farms by the military, leading to arbitrary imprisonments without trial, intimidations, beatings, and fatalities. In the course of the agitation and its aftermath, the Anjuman Mazarain mounted various legal challenges against the military in Pakistani courts. These challenges placed the military ownership of the farmlands under legal scrutiny and made the very claim of ownership of these lands a legal and even a political question. The court proceedings established that the Pakistani military was, in fact, not in any legal position to introduce changes to the peasant contract and was even less able to establish, through documentary evidence, its proprietary status as the landowner. 65 As a consequence of the legal pronouncements, the tenants of Okara and Khanewal military farms have not surrendered any share of their crop yields to the military, Pakistan's most powerful institution, and have continued to retain control over the land.
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, given that activists of the Anjuman Mazarain are predominantly Muslims and native Urdu speakers, they also deploy the term haq to demand their land rights. The justificatory premise of their deployment of haq is neither cosmological nor tied to demands for citizenship; instead, it is embedded in and derives its justification from Islamic jurisprudentialism and qur'anic meanings and is consequently tied very strongly to the idea of right conduct. However, not unlike the demands of the activist groups in Rajasthan described above, the Islamic premise deployed by the Mazarain also exceeds the legal category of rights and in contrast to the Islamic accounts of haq presented by Rosen, Hirsch, and Geertz are claims against the state for the restitution of laws of ownership under secular legal arrangements and not against particular persons under Islamic personal law. The following narrative of an activist of the Anjuman Mazarain at Khanewal allows us to document a use of haq that derives its mainstay from a popular Islamic understanding but is deployed outside of a strictly religious context and toward what might be seen as secular ends.
This word [haq] comes from Islam because Islam clearly marks out a very clear definition of the practices and conduct that constitutive of right behavior. Islam invokes haq in two separate ways: (a) as Haqooq ul Allah, which is to do with right conduct in the discharge of religious obligations such as offering prayers five times a day, fasting during Ramzan and fulfilling all those religious that make me a good Muslim and (b) Haqooq -ul-abad, which relates to right conduct in respect of other human beings including towards my government and my family . . . The right to cultivate and possess ownership is prescribed in the Holy Qur'an. For instance, in the Qur'an on paragraph 3, it says very clearly: if someone who cultivated the land for five years, he then becomes the owner of the land. Therefore, the Mazarain have a right over the land which is justified by Islam itself. 66 In this particular narrative, I am less interested in questions of "purity" or the faithful recalling of the qu'ranic passage and more in the marshaling of qur'anic texts by peasant activists in their struggle for land rights. Furthermore, I am not suggesting that this narrative reflects a definitive version of Islamic haq but only that it is a notion of haq that traces its normative underpinnings to Islamic texts and to mystical Islam. 67 However, as pointed out in the narrative, it is indeed correct that within Islamic scholarly heritage, the notion of haq is often evoked as right conduct. In Islamic texts, for instance, haq is referred to as "right things" and contrasted with batil or wrong things. "Haq is the doing of right things like the acts of obedience, the doing of which God has not forbidden" and batil or "wrong things" is "associated with injustice, Kufr, and the acts of disobedience. Both are equally God's creation. But the one is right and the other is wrong." 68 This interpretation of something being morally right and or "morally straight" is quite distinct from having a right over something or possessing something. The "morally right" sense of rights finds clear elucidation in early Western political philosophical texts; consequently, the history of Western political concepts is replete with an intense speculation as to when rights as we know them today came to acquire their possessive meaning as opposed to their earlier meaning, which evoked "moral rectitude." I want to add here that haq as "right conduct" must not be viewed as a genderneutral term nor should its intellectual justification invoking Islamic heritage be regarded as "nonpolitical."
69 Although the Anjuman Mazarain protests have seen large mobilizations of women peasants, supported by a range of women's rights activists, the question of gender equality has needed to be investigated separately and has not emerged organically as part of the demands made by the movement. And even if women's participation and demands for landownership rights alongside the male activists has "indicated a shift (even if only in symbolic terms) in the existing thinking from community rights to women's rights especially when due share in inheritance and property were until very recently not subjects of public debate," any consolidation of this "shift," will require building up "long term linkages" across the women's movement in Pakistan, including alliances of solidarity between peasant women in rural Pakistan and urban women activists campaigning for women's rights in the cities of Lahore and Karachi.
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Vernacular Rights Cultures, Rights, and Human Rights
At this point, you might ask why should we frame these rights mobilizations and deployments of haq in terms of vernacular rights cultures and not simply as yet more growing evidence of the globalization and expansion of human rights. For is it not now commonplace to argue that the last two hundred and fifty years have witnessed the "global diffusion of human rights culture?" 71 Or at times more warily, that human rights have become the "most globalized political values of our times?" 72 While the celebrators and detractors of human rights link the causes of this spread of rights variously to the impact of Western colonialism, immigration, international legal instruments, and global communication, the fundamental assumption informing these arguments is an Orientalist one: that the conceptual, philosophical, and empirical experience of rights can be traced to the revolutions of the modern West and are in fact a testament to the incontrovertible march of progress and civilization heralded by them.
In recent years, however, scholars have produced precise histories detailing the "invention" of human rights, disrupting the earlier impulse to aggregate a variety of "Western" rights talk in different historical periods with that of contemporary international human rights law and politics.
73 They have written of the "indeterminacy" and paradoxical nature of rights and pointed to the contradictory, alienating, exclusionary, and politically conservative effects of a universalizing and homogenizing human rights politics. 74 In many critical accounts, human rights are seen as constituting a "central" element of United States-led globalization, capitalism, and world trade and thereby as implicated and invested in upholding existing global power relations and hierarchies of representation. 75 Characterized as a "global secular religion" and as "biopolitical rights," they are critiqued for "producing technologies of transnational governmentality." 76 Within recent human rights scholarship, one can discern at least two distinct strands of critical disciplinary-based scholarship on human rights. The first is mainly that of political philosophy/theory, concerning itself mostly with the logics of equality, democracy, and citizenship and in particular with the "right to have rights." 77 The second, mainly anthropological work, has engaged thoughtfully with the limits of liberalism and legal constitutionalism in the postcolony, with the "active social life" of rights and their "vernacularization on the ground," and with the intersection of biopolitical technologies, law, and the market. 78 While both sets of scholarly debates inform thinking on vernacular rights cultures, they are by themselves insufficient, and we require yet more complexity. For instance, recent debates on the relation between rights and citizenship have focused on the logic of equality or on acts of citizenship through which noncitizens seek the right to have rights that have already been declared. 79 However, paying attention to the production of vernacular rights cultures reveals that the mobilization of marginal and dispossessed groups does not just involve a logic of equality and inclusion through which dispossessed groups demand already existing rights. Rather, these mobilizations seek not only to alter the means through which rights are delivered but also to transform the content and meaning of the rights that are already in place while also demanding that new rights are brought into being, as the right to food and right to forest lands movements described here make clear. Furthermore, the recent efforts to study "vernacularization on the ground," where vernacularization refers to the "process of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies of vernacularization," is an important intervention into studying the "local uses of global women's rights" in different sites. 80 Ultimately though, these efforts suffer from a significant conceptual difficulty: they operate within and actively reproduce the binaries of the epistemic-authorial global versus the nonepistemic translating local-and thereby foreclose agency and authorship of rights from elsewhere, not least from the margins.
A key component of vernacularization of human rights, according to Merry and Levitt, is their "translation," which is done by a "chain" of "vernacularizers" from the global to the national and all the way to the local. Merry and Levitt are careful to point out the differential power relations and vulnerabilities of vernacularizers that influence their effectiveness in different contexts and allow vernacularizers to "talk back" to the "global values packages." However, it is unclear from the examples they provide how this "talking back" displaces either the epistemic center of human rights from which rights travel and become vernacularized (which they identify as the West) or indeed the content or forms and modes of expression of human rights. For Merry and Levitt, vernacularization or indeed vernacularizers leave epistemic hierarchies intact. To think in terms of vernacular rights cultures, on the other hand, is to insist on a nonlinear, historical, and transnational analysis of rights/human rights discourses without ignoring the power dynamics in which these operate.
As I have illustrated through the rights ethnographies in this essay, vernacular rights cultures inhabit particular political imaginaries and arise as movements to make demands for rights that are inflected with the particular cultures, histories, and contexts of political mobilizations. And although they can be transnational in nature-in terms of shared legal and political histories, resonances, and even active linkages with similar forms of oppression and related historical cultural contexts such as the newly developing links between the right to food movement in India and the via campesina in Latin America-they are rooted in an insistence that we must not lose sight of the cultural, historical, linguistic, and political specificity of rights claims and also of the political imaginaries these inhabit. 81 Furthermore, while I think it is important and interesting to track how "global rights" transfer and "translate" into different settings, it is only one strand/aspect of rights activism and must be accompanied by analyses of not only how certain rights became global/universal but also how these in turn undergo expansion and change under pressure from collective struggles.
We need to see rights and human rights activism beyond prisms of discrete agentbased activism, even though individual agents play important roles in "transferring and translating" rights, to examine the ways in which transnational principles, practices, and imaginaries of rights are sutured with the multiple histories, imaginaries, subjectivities, and contexts in which they are formed and reflect a history of struggles that is both local and transnational. To sum up, rather than suggesting that a relatively unchanging, universal set of abstract principles or an authoritative set of rights are filled out with particular "localized" content in diverse contexts, vernacular rights cultures suggest that transnational rights principles, imaginaries, and practices are shaped and transformed through the diverse and multiple contexts in which rights are demanded and exercised.
Conclusion
The movements for haq I am tracking in this essay are precariously positioned live struggles. The Anjuman Mazarain continue to protest in the face of heavy securitization of their lands. The right to food movement is seeing its legislative gains eroded with the ruling right-wing BJP-led government threatening to cut back food security entitlements. And JZJA and India's forest communities face the impending threat of a dilution of the Forest Act 2006 and increased state violence, coercion, and dispossession in order to make way for easier land acquisition for private investment, as well as further restrictions on forest lands through converting them into national parks. Even as I write this, news is rolling in of an "executive order," the first of its kind, cancelling the rights of tribal communities under the Forest Rights Act in order to "facilitate coal mining" by a syndicate of transnational and national capital in Eastern India.
82
To conclude, then, the three different political imaginaries of haq that I document in this essay-constitutional/legal citizenship, entitlements of the prior, and those based on Islam-are all produced, articulated, and negotiated within live political contexts of struggle and precarity and provide insights into how vernacular rights cultures are mobilized. A focus on vernacular rights cultures enables a conceptual optic into the "active" conceptual, empirical, epistemic, and political life of rights and into the specific stakes and struggles for rights in different locations while refusing straightforward originary and binary descriptions of these as either merely local variants of global rights talk or as radically and incomprehensibly different from one another.
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